fix: harden dashboard auth and terminal flows
Deploy Dashboard (Dev) / deploy-dev (push) Successful in 3m29s

Tighten terminal websocket auth and proxy trust handling while making file-backed auth/RBAC writes atomic to reduce high-impact security and persistence risks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Gan, Jimmy
2026-03-06 23:53:58 +08:00
parent c9f06fbbbb
commit 44f0ed5d04
9 changed files with 337 additions and 175 deletions
+48 -30
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
import os
import ipaddress
from fastapi import Request
# Dashboard v1.3 — Runner DNS fix applied
GITEA_URL = os.environ.get("GITEA_URL", "http://gitea:3000")
@@ -63,43 +65,59 @@ OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN = os.environ.get("OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN", "")
# Networking configs
LAN_IP_RANGES = os.environ.get("LAN_IP_RANGES", "192.168.31.0/24").split(",")
TRUSTED_PROXIES = os.environ.get("TRUSTED_PROXIES", "127.0.0.1,::1,172.21.0.1").split(",")
def _parse_ip(ip_str: str):
try:
return ipaddress.ip_address((ip_str or "").strip())
except ValueError:
return None
def _ip_matches_ranges(ip_str: str, ranges: list[str]) -> bool:
ip_obj = _parse_ip(ip_str)
if ip_obj is None:
return False
for subnet_str in ranges:
subnet_str = subnet_str.strip()
if not subnet_str:
continue
try:
if "/" in subnet_str:
if ip_obj in ipaddress.ip_network(subnet_str, strict=False):
return True
elif ip_obj == ipaddress.ip_address(subnet_str):
return True
except ValueError:
continue
return False
def is_lan_ip(ip_str: str) -> bool:
"""Check if IP is in local LAN (not Tailscale)"""
import ipaddress
try:
ip_obj = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str)
for subnet_str in LAN_IP_RANGES:
if ip_obj in ipaddress.ip_network(subnet_str.strip()):
return True
return False
except ValueError:
return False
return _ip_matches_ranges(ip_str, LAN_IP_RANGES)
def is_tailscale_ip(ip_str: str) -> bool:
"""Check if IP is in Tailscale CGNAT range (100.64.0.0/10)"""
import ipaddress
try:
ip_obj = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str)
return ip_obj in ipaddress.ip_network("100.64.0.0/10")
except ValueError:
return False
return _ip_matches_ranges(ip_str, ["100.64.0.0/10"])
TRUSTED_PROXIES = os.environ.get("TRUSTED_PROXIES", "127.0.0.1,::1,172.16.0.0/12").split(",")
def is_trusted_proxy(ip_str: str) -> bool:
import ipaddress
try:
ip_obj = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str)
for subnet_str in TRUSTED_PROXIES:
subnet_str = subnet_str.strip()
if "/" in subnet_str:
if ip_obj in ipaddress.ip_network(subnet_str):
return True
else:
if ip_obj == ipaddress.ip_address(subnet_str):
return True
return False
except ValueError:
return False
return _ip_matches_ranges(ip_str, TRUSTED_PROXIES)
def get_forwarded_client_ip(request: Request) -> str | None:
source_ip = request.client.host if request.client else ""
if not is_trusted_proxy(source_ip):
return None
forwarded_for = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for", "")
forwarded_ip = forwarded_for.split(",", 1)[0].strip()
return forwarded_ip or None
def get_client_ip(request: Request) -> str:
return get_forwarded_client_ip(request) or (request.client.host if request.client else "")