7 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Gan, Jimmy	ddaf3c6cee	security: Sprint 00 — critical security fixes (OPC WS auth, Transmission creds, SECRET_KEY, passkey rate limit) ... - Add JWT token auth to OPC WebSocket (unauthenticated → 403, per-user tracking) - Externalize Transmission RPC credentials to TRANSMISSION_USER/PASS env vars - Remove hardcoded SECRET_KEY fallback from dev compose - Rate-limit passkey register options endpoint at 5/minute - Add PDD (docs/improvement-plan.md) and sprint specs (specs/) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-05-03 13:31:25 +08:00
Gan, Jimmy	c5987b1b6b	security: fix passkey admin privilege escalation (issue #1) ... CRITICAL: Passkey authentication was hardcoded to always grant admin role, completely bypassing RBAC and allowing any passkey user to gain full admin access. Changes: - Store username and role in passkey credential during registration - Retrieve and use stored role during authentication (not hardcoded admin) - Fallback to admin for legacy credentials without role field Security Impact: - Prevents privilege escalation via passkey authentication - Enforces proper RBAC for passkey users - Maintains backward compatibility with existing passkeys Tests: 214 passing	2026-04-08 01:02:37 +08:00
Gan, Jimmy	dac163d88c	security: fix critical vulnerabilities (issues #2 and #3) ... Issue #2: Unprotected Chat Summary Trigger (CRITICAL) - Add authentication and admin authorization to /trigger endpoint - Add path validation to prevent directory traversal - Block access to system directories (/etc, /root, /sys, /proc, /boot) - Add tests for unauthorized access and invalid paths Issue #3: Exception Information Disclosure (HIGH) - Replace raw exception messages with generic errors - Log full exception details server-side with logger.exception() - Affected files: auth.py, files.py, passkey.py, opc_agents.py - Prevents information leakage about system architecture Security Impact: - Prevents unauthenticated file system writes - Reduces reconnaissance opportunities for attackers - Maintains security while preserving debugging capability Tests: 214 passing, all security tests verified	2026-04-08 00:57:14 +08:00
Gan, Jimmy	b981c06d59	feat: comprehensive test infrastructure improvements ... - Fix unit test imports: add env setup in conftest.py before module imports - Add 24 new auth router tests (RBAC, preferences, password validation) - Add 16 new tests for litellm and chat_summary routers - Apply black formatting and ruff linting across codebase - Add pre-commit hooks configuration (black, ruff, file checks) - Increase CI coverage threshold from 40% to 50% Test Results: - 206 tests passing (91 unit + 115 integration) - Coverage: 58.79% on core modules - auth.py: 57% → 85%, litellm.py: 23% → 87%, chat_summary.py: 41% → 100% - auth_service: 96.51%, config: 100%, rbac: 93.48%	2026-04-08 00:21:32 +08:00
Gan, Jimmy	1b769bca1d	fix: rename auth module to auth_service to resolve circular import	2026-04-02 01:02:45 +08:00
Gan, Jimmy	4201917e17	fix: harden dashboard RBAC and cookie auth flows ... Restrict Docker/Files writes to admins, move terminal websocket auth to cookie-first with temporary query fallback, and migrate refresh-token handling to httpOnly cookies for safer session persistence. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-03-09 23:44:23 +08:00
Gan, Jimmy	ae437db92e	refactor: split auth router into focused modules ... Split the 429-line auth.py into three modules for better maintainability: - auth.py (264 lines): core auth, login, token refresh, RBAC, preferences - passkey.py (187 lines): WebAuthn passkey registration and authentication - totp.py (41 lines): TOTP 2FA setup and verification All 21 endpoints maintain backward compatibility under /api/auth prefix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-03-01 22:19:33 +08:00