Gan, Jimmy
c7a0a53fe8
Deploy Dashboard / deploy (push) Successful in 3m37s
Remove SSH private keys from git, add SECRET_KEY validation, move WS auth from query string to first message, add session limits/idle timeout, PBKDF2 Fernet key, refresh token rotation, TOTP replay protection, file upload size limit + filename sanitization, symlink safety check, restrict CORS methods, IP-gate OpenClaw token, run container as non-root, rate-limit refresh/passkey endpoints, sanitize Gitea path params. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
113 lines
3.3 KiB
Python
113 lines
3.3 KiB
Python
import os
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import re
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import shutil
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from pathlib import Path
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from fastapi import APIRouter, UploadFile, File, HTTPException
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from fastapi.responses import FileResponse
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from config import VOLUME_ROOT
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router = APIRouter()
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BASE = Path(VOLUME_ROOT)
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MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE = 100 * 1024 * 1024 # 100 MB
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BLOCKED_DIRS = {"@appstore", "@docker", "@eaDir", "@S2S", "@sharesnap", "@tmp", "docker", "homes", "backups"}
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_BASE_RESOLVED = str(BASE.resolve())
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def _safe_path(path: str) -> Path:
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target = (BASE / path).resolve()
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if not str(target).startswith(_BASE_RESOLVED):
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raise ValueError("forbidden")
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# Block access to sensitive directories
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rel = target.relative_to(BASE.resolve())
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if rel.parts and rel.parts[0] in BLOCKED_DIRS:
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raise ValueError("forbidden")
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return target
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def _is_safe_symlink(item: Path) -> bool:
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"""Check if a symlink resolves to a path within BASE and not in blocked dirs."""
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if not item.is_symlink():
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return True
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try:
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resolved = item.resolve()
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if not str(resolved).startswith(_BASE_RESOLVED):
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return False
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rel = resolved.relative_to(BASE.resolve())
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if rel.parts and rel.parts[0] in BLOCKED_DIRS:
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return False
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return True
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except (OSError, ValueError):
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return False
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def _sanitize_filename(name: str) -> str:
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name = os.path.basename(name)
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name = name.replace("\x00", "").replace("/", "").replace("\\", "")
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name = re.sub(r'\.\.+', '.', name)
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name = name.strip(". ")
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if not name:
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raise ValueError("invalid filename")
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return name
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@router.get("/browse")
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def browse(path: str = ""):
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try:
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target = _safe_path(path)
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except ValueError:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access denied")
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entries = []
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for item in sorted(target.iterdir()):
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try:
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if not _is_safe_symlink(item):
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continue
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st = item.stat()
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entries.append({"name": item.name, "is_dir": item.is_dir(), "size": st.st_size if item.is_file() else 0})
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except (PermissionError, OSError):
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continue
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return {"path": str(target.relative_to(BASE)), "entries": entries}
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@router.get("/download")
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def download(path: str):
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try:
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return FileResponse(_safe_path(path))
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except ValueError:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access denied")
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@router.post("/upload")
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async def upload(path: str, file: UploadFile = File(...)):
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try:
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safe_name = _sanitize_filename(file.filename)
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target = _safe_path(path) / safe_name
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except ValueError:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access denied")
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# Stream with size check
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total = 0
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with open(target, "wb") as f:
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while chunk := await file.read(1024 * 1024):
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total += len(chunk)
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if total > MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE:
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f.close()
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target.unlink(missing_ok=True)
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raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="File too large (max 100MB)")
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f.write(chunk)
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return {"ok": True}
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@router.delete("/delete")
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def delete(path: str):
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try:
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target = _safe_path(path)
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except ValueError:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access denied")
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if target.is_dir():
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shutil.rmtree(target)
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else:
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target.unlink()
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return {"ok": True}
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